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economic and expressive activity. The essays in this 
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anti-monopoly tools might usefully be deployed to 
expose or counter this power. 
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INTRODUCTION
The fear that a single actor can decide what can or can-not be said in large parts of the online public sphere has led to growing calls for measures to promote competition between dig-
ital platforms. At the same time, others are demanding greater coopera-
tion between the custodians of the public sphere. These pressures are not 
necessarily at odds, but some work needs to be done to reconcile them. 
To what extent should platforms have consistent content moderation 
policies? If standards and guardrails are imposed on the public sphere, 
should platforms work together to ensure that the online ecosystem as a 
whole realizes these standards, or would society benefit more if it is every 
platform for itself?
These are questions that need answering as society and regulators 
demand that platforms become more responsible gatekeepers. Economic 
competition alone cannot solve many of the speech-related pathologies 
in online discourse. Collaboration between tech platforms on especially 
intractable problems allows us to break free of the false dichotomy 
between too few online gatekeepers holding too much power, on the one 
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hand, and a fragmented online public sphere constituted by multiple 
fiercely competitive platforms, on the other. 
But this collaboration must be done in a way that keeps a broader 
sense of the public interest at its core. Currently, most collaboration takes 
the form of rushed ad hoc alliances of convenience that arise in response 
to particular crises. The pressure to do something can lead to the creation 
of systems and structures that serve the interests of the very tech plat-
forms that they seek to rein in. I call these content cartels: arrangements 
between platforms to work together to remove content or actors from their 
services without adequate oversight. These come in various guises; they 
can be demanded, encouraged, participated in, or unheeded by regula-
tors. But they share the characteristic that they compound the existing 
lack of accountability in platform content moderation. 
In this paper, I begin by tracing the origin and spread of content 
cartels in Part I, showing that content cartels are the proposed response 
to an increasing number of pathologies in online discourse. Part II exam-
ines the impulses behind demands for greater cooperation and the ways 
in which such cooperation can be beneficial. Part III explores the failures 
of the current arrangements and the threats they pose to free speech. 
Part IV sets an agenda for developing the tools to create productive and 
legitimate cooperation between platforms in those areas where it can be 
beneficial or has become inevitable. 
This paper has two goals. The first is to raise the alarm about a pos-
sible future coming into view, of unaccountable content cartels making 
decisions about the parameters of online discourse in a way that is just 
as problematic as an unaccountable monopoly. The second is to explore 
what can be beneficial about collaborative efforts and what might redeem 
them. This is a pivotal moment in the management of public discourse, 
and the structures built now should serve enduring values. We need not 
settle for institutions that stick band-aids on some problems but do not 
serve the deeper goal of building trust in online speech governance. 
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CONTENT CARTEL CREEP
The past few years have seen increasing demands for plat-forms to collaborate in fending off certain perceived threats cre-ated by online speech. These don’t resemble traditional cartels: 
They are not hidden but touted, and they are widely seen as beneficial or 
even necessary. They are also fragmented; rather than a single cartel-like 
agreement between set members, these arrangements are taking place in 
different ways in different spheres. But from small beginnings, content 
cartels are enveloping ever more difficult and contentious areas of online 
discourse.
The Pilot
Despite the legendarily ruthless competitiveness of Silicon Valley, plat-
forms have long cooperated on the removal of child sexual abuse mate-
rial (CSAM). Researcher Hany Farid and Microsoft developed a digital 
fingerprinting technology called photoDNA in 2009.1 This technology 
allows images to be “hashed” and added to databases run by nonprofits 
such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) 
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and the U.K.-based Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). Companies can 
then use these databases to automatically and preemptively prevent 
copies of included images from being uploaded to their services. Face-
book deployed photoDNA in 2010, Twitter in 2011, and Google in 2016. “In 
addition to these titans of technology, photoDNA is now in worldwide 
deployment,” writes Farid.2 Overall, this has been seen as a success story 
for tech collaboration.3 
Even in the case of CSAM, there were early concerns about this 
model of centralized censorship and its opacity.4 Despite CSAM being 
a relatively definable category of content, there can still be unexpected 
collateral damage without adequate procedural checks. The mistaken 
addition of the album art for the Scorpions album Virgin Killer by the 
IWF to its Child Abuse Imagery Database in 2008 not only caused ISPs 
to block access to the band’s Wikipedia entry but also prevented most 
U.K. web users from editing the entire Wikipedia domain, for example.5 
There have also been concerns raised about governance practices and 
independence.6 But in general, because the harm of CSAM is so great, 
the category of content so specific, and the agreement on both of these 
factors effectively universal, this cooperation between law enforce-
ment, civil society, and the major internet giants is seen as an important 
institutional innovation to combat the explosion in CSAM caused by the 
internet. 
This is a pattern that will repeat in the story that follows. First, there 
is the identification of a threat caused by online speech that can be more 
effectively tackled through coordination. Initial concerns are voiced about 
the human rights implications of such centralized censorship measures. 
But ultimately those concerns give way to the view that the seriousness 
of the threat justifies such measures, provided that the domain is kept 
carefully circumscribed.
Spread to Terrorist Content
Specifically invoking the success of photoDNA, similar technology was 
developed to identify terrorist and extremist content. The model was the 
same: a database of content with hashing technology to check uploads 
to platform services to prevent the posting of infringing content. But 
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initially, in 2016, social media companies were hesitant. Executives 
expressed concern that, because the definition of “terrorist speech” is 
far less certain and far more contested than CSAM, content that ought to 
be protected from censorship might find its way into the joint database.7 
This concern is especially acute with respect to countries where the label 
“terrorist” is used to silence dissent and opposition. If a government or an 
industry partner added an image to the database, this would facilitate 
the image’s removal from a range of platforms and services, making it 
an intentionally nimble and powerful tool to meet the growing threat of 
online extremist content. But this power comes with risks. As one tech 
officer put it, “As soon as governments heard there was a central database 
of terrorism images, they would all come knocking.”8
And yet, by the end of 2016, platforms had changed their tune and 
announced plans for the database. A mere three years later, the data-
base—run by the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 
(GIFCT)—is a flagship initiative for disrupting terrorists’ use of platforms. 
Facebook and Google representatives appearing before a Senate commit-
tee held up the GIFCT as a sign of their more responsible custodianship of 
the public sphere and touted expansion plans.9 Monika Bickert of Face-
book told the senators that “one of the things that we’ve done over time is 
expand the mandate of the [GIFCT] ... . [W]e are sharing a broader variety 
of violent incidents.”10 The number of participants is also expanding.11 
Facebook recently open-sourced the technology it uses to match hashed 
videos against databases so that industry partners, smaller developers, 
and nonprofits can also use them to identify abusive content and share 
hashes.12 What changed?
This rapid turnaround followed a reversal in public sentiment toward 
tech and increased government pressure. European Union legislators 
demanded action after terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in late 
2015, threatening legislation if companies did not adopt “voluntary” 
initiatives.13 This led directly to the establishment of the GIFCT.14 The 
livestreaming and viral spread of the Christchurch massacre in March 
2019 was a similarly pivotal moment for the initiative. In the wake of that 
tragedy, public and governmental demands for greater action from tech 
companies has resulted in (so far) voluntary commitments to expand 
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the GIFCT and its resources.15 This increased capacity of the GIFCT was 
credited with preventing a livestreamed shooting modeled on the Christ-
church attack in Halle, Germany, from going viral.16 Governments have 
since announced plans to ramp up task forces dedicated to working with 
the database, again specifically invoking the CSAM model.17 
This much of the story treads familiar ground. Danielle Citron has 
memorably coined this evolution “censorship creep” to describe how a 
tool intended to help execute one type of speech regulation (the removal 
of CSAM) comes to be used for others (such as terrorist content).18 But my 
focus is on a different aspect: It is not only the areas of censorship that 
have expanded but also companies’ cooperation. In another timeline, 
companies could instead have engaged in an arms race to develop the 
best technology to remove such content and find favor from regulators 
and users. Instead, they are agreeing to cooperate on the enforcement 
of more uniform norms of what should be available online. Although 
voluntary, this collaboration does not necessarily arise out of a sense of 
moral obligation—beyond regulatory threats, there are also reputational 
reasons it could be advantageous for companies to present a united front 
and avoid being singled out for difficult choices in areas not considered 
core to their product.19 As discussed below, there are ways this can 
be socially beneficial and not only serve the interests of the platforms 
involved: The premise of these institutional innovations is that platforms 
working together are more readily able to meet threats posed by the 
spread of disfavored content in the public sphere. 
Again, however, the dynamic was the same: an unlikely collabo-
ration between highly competitive firms, at first resisted and carefully 
circumscribed but ultimately embraced and expanded, in a form that 
lessens public pressure without increasing public accountability.
“Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior”
Content cartel creep is now spreading to the fight against foreign influ-
ence campaigns. This is an area of increased focus and activity, both 
from perpetrators and defenders alike, in a manner reminiscent of the 
increased concern about terrorist content a few years before the estab-
lishment of the GIFCT. 
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Online influence campaigns are often sophisticated, cross-plat-
form operations. According to a report prepared for the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, during the 2016 election Russia’s Internet Research 
Agency “operated like a digital marketing agency: develop a brand ... 
build presences on all channels across the entire social ecosystem, and 
grow an audience with paid ads as well as partnerships, influencers, 
and link-sharing. They created media mirages: interlinked information 
ecosystems designed to immerse and surround targeted audiences.”20 
This mirrors earlier experience with terrorists’ use of the internet, where 
groups used different platforms for different purposes, leveraging their 
unique affordances.21 This has only grown more true of recent influence 
campaigns. A Digital Forensic Research Lab investigation of a suspected 
Russian intelligence operation in 2019 found that it spanned over 30 plat-
forms in nine languages.22  
In detecting these types of influence campaigns, tech companies 
increasingly rely on sharing information with each other and govern-
ments.23 This kind of collaboration may be indispensable to counter-in-
fluence efforts.24 As a result, calls for collaboration are getting louder, 
and sharing and coordination has resulted in multiple simultaneous 
takedowns of accounts and content linked to related influence campaigns 
that operate across different platforms.25 
The case for cooperation in this context is simple and intuitive: If 
information operations work across different platforms, so too should 
the efforts to combat them. Researchers express dismay when pages and 
groups blocked on Facebook continue to operate accounts on Twitter, 
YouTube, and Instagram.26 Even with information sharing, it may be 
months before smaller platforms identify accounts related to influence 
campaigns taken down by other platforms.27
Platform information sharing in this context is currently informal 
and ostensibly ad hoc. It is also opaque: In September 2019, in a secretive 
gathering from which few details emerged, U.S. law enforcement repre-
sentatives met with Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter to discuss 
election interference ahead of the 2020 election.28 But there are calls for 
such collaboration to expand and become systematic. The bipartisan 
Senate Intelligence Committee report on Russia’s use of social media in 
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the 2016 election again specifically invoked the NCMEC model in calling 
for Congress to “consider ways to facilitate productive coordination and 
cooperation between U.S. social media companies and the pertinent gov-
ernment agencies.”29 Rep. Ro Khanna has floated legislation to encour-
age such cooperation.30 Likening the model to banks working together 
to share data to detect fraud, Khanna wants a consortium for sharing 
disinformation threats to ensure that a bad actor can’t be “kicked off 
Facebook and just go open an account on Twitter.”31 Similarly, a Stanford 
report has called for building a body to coordinate efforts to combat disin-
formation, modeled on successful examples like the nonprofit Financial 
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which works to ensure 
resilience and continuity of global financial services and has its own 
budget, staff with security clearances to receive threat briefings, technical 
tools, and the power to facilitate sharing and consensus building among 
the membership.32 It suggested that Congress should create specific 
antitrust safe harbors to allow such coordination around the sharing of 
information and banning of proscribed content.33 An NYU report also 
called for the formation of a “permanent intercompany task force devoted 
to fighting disinformation,” specifically invoking platform collaboration 
through the GIFCT and photoDNA as a model of the “spirit of cooperation 
that ought to infuse the push to limit disinformation.”34 
The Stanford report highlights an essential caveat that is absent from 
current collaborations: Tighter coordination needs to have third-party 
oversight to be credible and legitimate.35 Without oversight, there is 
little to ensure that individual rights will be adequately respected. Such 
oversight is often part of the original vision of these collaborations, at 
the point of the conversation when free speech concerns are given their 
fullest hearing. But, as discussed further below, so far this has not been 
realized in practice. 
The Creep Continues
Similar themes permeate the conversation about the threat of synthetic 
media, more commonly referred to as “deepfakes.” As concerns rise about 
the potential for deepfake videos to swing elections or ruin lives through 
an invasion of sexual privacy, there are calls to create a GIFCT-style 
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database of such media to prevent their spread online.36 Even further 
from its roots in the CSAM database, the societal conversation about how 
to define the category of synthetic media that should be removed from 
social media has barely begun. While CSAM material is harmful in every 
form and context, this cannot be said of synthetic media, which can be 
used for educational or entertainment purposes. 
Further still along this path are calls for a more collaborative, 
whole-of-internet approach to be adopted toward hate speech and 
extremism more broadly. Rep. Khanna, for example, has suggested that 
his proposed consortium could facilitate information-sharing not only 
with respect to disinformation but also with information about hate 
speech and other inflammatory content.37 A U.K. white paper on “online 
harms” proposed a new regulator to foster a “culture of cooperation” 
between companies, noting that “[u]sers perpetrating harm often move 
between platforms, especially to behave illegally and disseminate illegal 
content. A greater level of cooperation between platforms by sharing 
observations and best practices to prevent harms spreading from one pro-
vider to another will be essential.”38 A candidate for the U.S. Democratic 
Party nomination for president called for uniformity across the industry, 
saying, “[Y]ou can’t have one set of standards for Facebook and another 
for Twitter.”39 Again, many of these proposals are framed as natural pro-
gressions of the previous models. As former Facebook Chief Security Offi-
cer Alex Stamos told Congress last year, “[The GIFCT] has been somewhat 
successful in building capabilities in smaller members while creating a 
forum for collaboration among the larger members. It is time to follow 
this initial foray with a much more ambitious coordinating body between 
tech companies focused on adversarial use of their technologies.”40 
Other forms of platform alignment could occur through speech 
decisions being repackaged as trust and safety tools and services that 
platforms can offer each other. Jigsaw, a technology incubator created by 
Google, has developed Perspective API, which helps platforms moderate 
content by using machine learning models to detect “toxic” comments.41 
It is used by Latin America’s second-largest social platform, Taringa!, for 
example.42 This creates the danger that biases in one platform’s data will 
find their way into how other platforms moderate. In the case of Perspec-
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tive, researchers have raised concerns that the tool has a disparate impact 
on already marginalized communities.43 Another example is Microsoft’s 
announcement44 in January that it is developing software to recognize 
online predators attempting to lure children for sexual purposes, which it 
will release to other companies free of charge.45
Stamos has suggested that smaller platforms’ need for assistance in 
content moderation may go beyond the supply of mere tools and might 
even create its own industry:
Say you start a company and all of a sudden the Nazis take over ... there 
are very few people you can call to come help you with your Nazi problem, 
or with your child safety problem or your suicide problem ... you can’t 
expect that every company builds all these things from scratch ... . You 
could see Facebook turning their experience scaling trust and safety into 
an actual service they provide to all of the smaller companies who can’t 
afford to hire thousands of people themselves.46 
All such proposals are a long way from the carefully circumscribed CSAM 
databases. But if you build it, they will come. And often, once there is a 
decision that certain content cannot be left to the marketplace of ideas, 
the decision quickly follows that platforms should cooperate to ensure 
consistent enforcement.
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CARTELS AS CUSTODIANS
What explains the phenomenon of content cartel creep? There are a number of forces at work that serve as rationalizations for the need for platforms to cooperate more 
and across a greater variety of contexts.
Competition Is Not a Cure-All
Content cartel creep is at least in part an implicit acknowledgment 
that the relationship between economic competition in the platform 
market and a healthy public sphere is complicated. There are a number 
of speech-related pathologies in the current online environment that 
competition alone cannot solve. Of course, monopoly power over public 
discourse is a significant concern—it is not only government officials who 
should not be able to declare what is “orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion.”47 But while greater competition 
will alleviate this threat (and, importantly, other non-speech harms), 
there are a number of speech-related harms for which competition is not 
a sufficient answer.48 Indeed, the call for platforms to be better gate-
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keepers and “custodians of the internet,” as Tarleton Gillespie has so 
evocatively labeled them,49 can at times be in tension with concerns that 
platforms hold too much power to determine the bounds of acceptable 
discourse. Jillian C. York and Ethan Zuckerman observe that decentral-
ization as a cure for the concentration of power in the major platforms 
“replace[s] one set of moderation problems—the massive power of the 
platform owner—with another problem: the inability to remove offensive 
or illegal content from the [i]nternet.”50 Aviv Ovadya calls this the “‘magi-
cal decentralization fallacy’—the mistaken belief that decentralization on 
its own can address governance problems.”51 Ovadya argues that in cases 
of misinformation and harassment, “decentralization just turns a hard 
centralized problem into a harder coordination problem.”52 European 
Union Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has more colorfully 
likened the problem to the hydra: chop off one head and “two or seven 
[come] up—so there is a risk you do not solve the problem[;] you just have 
many more problems.”53  
These critiques highlight that focusing on the threat of monopoly 
power alone risks overlooking the many other concerns that exist in the 
public sphere as it is currently constituted. Fears about the spread of hate 
speech, disinformation, election interference, filter bubbles and echo 
chambers, facilitation of government censorship, and the coarsening of 
public discourse are all on the rise, and none would necessarily disap-
pear if large platforms did.54 As momentum for antitrust action against 
big tech grows, so too does the recognition that there are many problems 
antitrust cannot solve.55 Some pathologies, such as echo chambers56 or 
the spread of low-quality or radicalizing content driven by optimization 
for engagement,57 could be exacerbated in a hypercompetitive environ-
ment. In other cases, potential structural fixes, such as increased friction 
to slow down the spread of harmful content or increase information 
fidelity and cognitive autonomy,58 will not be supplied by the market 
alone. User preference often seems to manifest as friction for thee, but 
not for me. Therefore, as Commissioner Vestager recently said, “[I]t’s 
understandable that people sometimes think of competition as a panacea, 
a universal answer to all society’s problems. But it can’t be that. ... [I]f, as 
a society, we want to lay down fundamental standards ... then what we 
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need is not more competition enforcement. We need regulation.”59 
This is underscored by the fact that certain online speech-related 
harms are not confined to one platform or business model.60 Time 
and again, the same harms recreate themselves on different platforms. 
Telegram is a popular encrypted nonprofit messaging app that does not 
algorithmically rank user content. Even this plain-vanilla app can be 
employed for different ends: It has been both a tool for activists in Hong 
Kong and Iran as well as a meeting place for far-right extremists.61 When 
Telegram purged a number of ISIS accounts, they migrated to a plat-
form called Riot, and when Riot also cracked down the accounts found 
refuge in TamTam, a platform very similar to Telegram but smaller and 
with limited capacity to respond.62 WhatsApp, another non-algorithmi-
cally mediated messaging service, has been implicated in the spread of 
misinformation, hate speech, and violence in places as diverse as India, 
Brazil, and Nigeria.63 These concerns about WhatsApp are now echoing 
in the fears about content on TikTok arising as that platform becomes 
more popular.64 This illustrates that these problems permeate across 
internet platforms. As Alexis Madrigal put it, “If you were to declare that 
both WhatsApp and Facebook were problems, you come uncomfortably 
close to admitting that mobile communications pose fundamental chal-
lenges to societies across the world. Which ... there is a decent case for.”65 
Because, while the problem with Facebook is of course, in some part, 
Facebook,66 “part of the problem with Facebook and other platforms is 
people, easily distracted, highly susceptible to misinformation, and prone 
to herd behavior.”67 
Standards as Barriers to Entry
If competition cannot be relied upon to solve current online speech-re-
lated pathologies, then standards can be imposed through regulation 
or social pressure. But without collaboration, such standard-setting can 
itself create barriers to entry and harm competition. While larger plat-
forms have developed tools and can devote the resources to the problems 
that inevitably accompany providing a platform for user-generated con-
tent, this is not true for smaller companies. Commissioner Vestager notes 
that requiring consistent responsibilities from big and small companies 
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alike risks giving many potential disruptors “no chance of competing.”68 
The problem is especially acute for small platforms and startups, 
which may find themselves the host of certain kinds of content that they 
didn’t anticipate when starting, for example, a gaming livestreaming plat-
form or a community for knitters and crocheters. April Glaser explored 
the example of Discord, a chat platform for gamers that found itself 
host to white supremacist groups: “How a company like Discord should 
deal with this activity isn’t necessarily obvious. Discord doesn’t have the 
resources of Facebook or Twitter, which have drawn a clearer line of what 
kinds of speech and activity they tolerate on their platforms, and Discord 
most likely can’t dedicate large teams to building machine learning tools 
aimed at ferreting out hate.”69 As an indicative figure, YouTube spent 
over $100 million on developing the technology it uses to identify copy-
right violations70—a totally unimaginable amount for smaller players. 
Facebook’s head of counterterrorism puts it bluntly: Plenty of startups are 
“just trying to keep the lights on, and nobody realizes that they need to 
be dealing with this.”71 Cloudflare—a cloud service provider—explained, 
when announcing its decision to share CSAM tools to all its clients for 
free, that “as the regulatory hurdles around dealing with incredibly 
difficult issues like CSAM continue to increase, many of them lack access 
to sophisticated tools to scan proactively for CSAM. You have to get big to 
get into the club that gives you access to these tools, and, concerningly, 
being in the club is increasingly a prerequisite to getting big.”72
Collaboration is one way of resolving this tension. David Kaye, the 
U.N. special rapporteur for freedom of expression, for example, has 
called for this in the context of developing tools to detect hate speech, 
saying that “[t]he largest companies should bear the burden of these 
resources and share their knowledge and tools widely, as open source, to 
ensure that smaller companies, and smaller markets, have access to such 
technology.”73 
Cross-Platform Threats
Another key driver of cartel creep is the fact that certain threats may not 
be identified, let alone addressed, without companies working together. 
This is especially true in the context of disinformation campaigns or ter-
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rorist groups which, as described above, often operate across a multitude 
of platforms; in such cases, industry information sharing can be essential 
to their detection, and lack of coordination can mean that bad actors 
booted from one site can continue operating on other platforms unen-
cumbered.74 Social media manipulation investigator Camille François has 
referenced “a key concern with regard to the current industry responses 
to viral deception: while disinformation actors exploit the whole infor-
mation ecosystem in campaigns that leverage different products and 
platforms, technology companies’ responses are mostly siloed within 
individual platforms (if not siloed by individual products!).”75 Stamos 
has similarly argued that “[t]he long tail of social platforms will struggle 
with information operations unless there are mechanisms for the smaller 
companies to benefit from the research the large companies can afford. 
There is some precedent in child exploitation and terrorism that can be 
built upon.”76
Cross-platform coordination addresses other problems too. For exam-
ple, in the cases of extremist content, smaller platforms see an increase 
in such content on their sites as major platforms crack down.77 So with-
out collaboration, these problems are not solved, only moved. Smaller 
platforms that do try to make changes can also find their efforts stymied 
by the lack of coordination by more mainstream sites. For example, as 
Pinterest took action against anti-vaccine misinformation, it found its 
efforts partially frustrated by the failure of other platforms to block such 
content, allowing users on Pinterest to simply link to it.78
Protecting Speech
Importantly, but perhaps counterintuitively, there are ways in which 
collaboration can result in greater speech protection through the devel-
opment and dissemination of more capable tools. Developing artificial 
intelligence tools for content moderation at scale is hard and resource-in-
tensive. In some cases, it will not be possible without access to large 
datasets of the kind that only the biggest platforms have access to. Trou-
blingly, and I return to this below, this means that the struggle for smaller 
companies and the drive to cartelization is especially strong when 
content moderation is hardest and most controversial. But in the absence 
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of tool-sharing, some platforms may resort to blunter measures. 
An illustrative example is JustPaste.it, a free content-sharing 
platform run by one person, a 26 year-old Polish man named Mariusz 
Żurawek. JustPaste.it unwittingly became a favored tool for those spread-
ing ISIS propaganda.79 Mariusz struggled with how to address complaints 
about his platform and how to moderate content in Arabic.80 Without 
assistance, one option was to remove Arabic content altogether. By 
joining the GIFCT, JustPaste.it was able to find a less drastic solution for 
identifying and removing terrorist propaganda. This is just one illustra-
tion of a recurrent dynamic where large platforms will have the nimblest 
and most nuanced detection tools.
Another way platform cooperation could protect speech is by giving 
companies political cover to resist governmental pressure to remove 
speech. Because such “jawboning” is often done away from the public 
eye, this is hard to evaluate, but for small platforms who might be espe-
cially susceptible to such pressure, pointing to an established process for 
detecting harmful content could help legitimate resistance. 
Cleaning Up Your Platform, Not Just Washing Your 
Hands
An important underlying theme of these developments is the need to 
think more holistically about the online content ecosystem, rather than 
taking a stovepipe, platform-by-platform approach to speech-related 
harms. The implication is often that the true Good Samaritans do not 
stop at cleaning up their own platform but also think about how their 
rule enforcement choices will affect the broader public discourse. Oth-
erwise, unilateral action by a platform may solve their problem, but not 
society’s. As Oren Segal, director of the Anti-Defamation League’s Center 
on Extremism, said in the context of extremism, “We’re having the same 
conversation every few months ... . Instead of talking about 8chan, today 
it’s Telegram. Instead of a Facebook stream, we’re talking about Twitch. I 
think that underscores a broader issue that extremists will migrate from 
platform to platform.”81 
Content cartels will never be all-encompassing. As one platform 
employee memorably told Sheera Frenkel of the New York Times, refer-
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ring to the CEOs of Facebook, Google, and Twitter, respectively, “I could 
see Mark [Zuckerberg], Sundar [Pichai] and Jack [Dorsey] tripping acid 
at Burning Man faster than I can see them all getting to a consensus on 
content policy.”82 But as public pressure and controversy around content 
decisions increases and becomes increasingly costly, the pressure not 
to compete on things not core to platforms’ business models may also 
increase. Content moderation is hard, and presenting a united front can 
prevent any individual company from receiving too much opprobrium for 
any particular decision. This may be especially true for smaller platforms, 
which can draft in the wake of higher-profile companies. 
As with any cartel, this could create a prisoner’s dilemma. An exam-
ple is the viral spread of a manipulated video of Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
that falsely made her appear drunk: When Facebook received sustained 
public criticism after deciding not to take the video down, others, most 
prominently YouTube, quickly reacted and took the video down, offering 
reasons of varying degrees of persuasiveness but receiving public credit 
anyway.83 
In particularly fraught cases, however, the risk-averse option will 
often be to act together. An especially notable example of this is the 
“de-platforming” of high-profile conspiracy theorist Alex Jones. Jones was 
protected by platforms’ desire not to be the arbiters of truth—until he 
wasn’t, all at once.84 When Apple removed Jones’s content from iTunes, 
other platforms fell like dominoes. Mark Zuckerberg decided to kick him 
off Facebook at 3 a.m. in a hotel room after hearing about Apple’s move.85 
It is unlikely that platforms across the industry arrived at the same con-
clusion at the same time after a delicate balancing of liberty and dignitary 
interests by coincidence. The same dynamic can be seen in operation in 
areas as diverse as platforms announcing rules against nonconsensual 
pornography in quick succession86 and the variety of hosts scrambling to 
prevent 8chan sitting on their servers when Cloudflare made the decision 
not to host it.87 These public pressures might be what has led Mark Zuck-
erberg to hope that Facebook’s new oversight board for content decisions 
will become an industry-wide body88—industry consistency can dilute 
public criticism. But it is not only companies that see benefits in this kind 
of industry consistency: The nonprofit Article 19, for example, is working 
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on a proposal for a multi-stakeholder “Social Media Council” account-
ability mechanism that incorporates platforms across the industry.89 
There is force behind the argument that standards established through 
legitimate processes should operate consistently across platforms. 
It is important to note that forces toward the cartelization of content 
decisions remain whether or not antitrust action is taken against the 
major social media platforms to break up individual companies, and 
whether or not smaller platforms come to displace the current monoliths 
that dominate the public sphere. These questions are not going away. 
Content cartels are fundamentally a response to the growing consensus 
that there are certain areas that need to be placed beyond competition, 
both in the economic marketplace and the marketplace of ideas. Civil 
society, users, and lawmakers are demanding more comprehensive 
responses from social media platforms, and platforms are seeing fewer 
upsides to resisting these calls in certain areas. Whatever regulatory 
action is taken with respect to the current tech giants to preserve the 
vitality of the public sphere, it needs to be done in a way that ensures 
that the problems of cartelization are not exacerbated. 
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THE COSTS OF CONTENT CARTELS
One way to read the story of content cartels is as a tale of progress. For some harms created by online speech, collabora-tion between tech platforms can significantly limit the damage, 
which is why such collaborations are being pushed. But just as monopoly 
power over public discourse can be pernicious even when exercised for 
ostensibly beneficial ends, an opaque cartel may be no better. This part 
discusses four key ways informal and unregulated cartels threaten to 
exacerbate underlying problems in current content moderation practices. 
Compounding Accountability Deficits
First, content cartels only compound the lack of transparency, due 
process, and accountability that come about when individual platforms 
make decisions about what speech should or should not be allowed on 
the internet. Content moderation more generally is going through a crisis 
of legitimacy. There is growing awareness about the arbitrary and unac-
countable way that tech companies develop and enforce their rules of 
what is allowed on their platforms. Content cartels exacerbate this—when 
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platforms act in concert, the actual source of any decision is harder to 
identify and hold to account. 
The GIFCT database is a good example. Emma Llansó has 
compellingly warned about the database’s longstanding transparency 
and accountability deficits.90 Nobody apart from consortium members 
knows what is in the database or who added any piece of content, and 
there are no established independent mechanisms to audit or challenge 
inclusions. By creating another layer between affected users and the 
source of the decision, access to remedy is more attenuated in cases of 
error even as the effects are magnified. If an image or URL is mistakenly 
classified as terrorist content by one platform, it is significantly more 
likely to be removed across all participating platforms instead of the 
mistake being confined to one service.91 
As content cartels move into areas where categories are more 
contested and ambiguous, the likelihood of mistakes rises. As Special 
Rapporteur Kaye has noted about the GIFCT, “This is not like child sexual 
abuse, for which there is a consensus around imagery that clearly and 
objectively meets a concrete definition. Rather, it is asking companies to 
make legal decisions, and fine ones at that, about what constitutes the 
elements of terrorism, of incitement to terrorism, of the glorification of 
terrorism.”92 Companies know this. As Brian Fishman, Facebook’s head 
of counterterrorism, has noted, “[T]errorist content might be shared for 
legitimate reasons by academics, activists decrying extremism, or jour-
nalists. The notion that there are legitimate reasons to share terrorist pro-
paganda significantly distinguishes this kind of content from other types 
of harmful content found online, most notably child pornography.”93
Mistakes are far from uncommon. The Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion (EFF) has documented many instances where materials have been 
removed from social media platforms in error.94 Famously, the Syrian 
Archive, a civil society organization that works to preserve evidence of 
human abuses in Syria, is in an ongoing struggle with YouTube, which 
has deleted over a hundred thousand of its videos.95 Companies are not 
the only ones to make mistakes: In April 2019, the French Internet Refer-
ral Unit sent a notice to the Internet Archive requiring the removal of over 
five hundred URLs it identified as “terrorist propaganda,” which included 
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such problematic content as the entire Project Gutenberg page of public 
domain texts, a massive Grateful Dead collection, and a page of C-SPAN 
recordings.96 
When such decisions are removed from public view and filtered 
through a collective but opaque institution, it is easier for mistakes to be 
missed, and for members to shirk blame for any that are found, by mak-
ing it more difficult to identify the source. This is problematic enough in 
cases of an innocent mistake, but it also creates a more powerful choke-
point for collateral censorship by governments.97 Cindy Cohn, executive 
director of the EFF, put it bluntly: “I wouldn’t want a central location 
where censorship decisions get made.”98 The pressures and motives that 
lead to mistakes in the context of terrorist and extremist content would 
crop up if the model of the GIFCT were to expand to other areas such 
as foreign influence operations, deepfakes, or hate speech. As Farid, a 
key researcher in the development of hashing technology, has himself 
observed:
It is important to understand that any technology such as that which we 
have developed and deployed can be misused. The underlying technol-
ogy is agnostic as to what it searches for and removes. When deploying 
photoDNA and eGlyph, we have been exceedingly cautious to control its 
distribution.99 
Because of this potential for abuse, building in third-party oversight 
and accountability mechanisms from the start is essential. The GIFCT 
example shows that when institutions are set up as reactions to particu-
lar crises, the institutional design may not serve longer-term or broader 
interests.
Creating a False Patina of Legitimacy
Second, content cartels create the risk of unaccountable errors even as 
they give decisions a greater patina of legitimacy. Announcements of 
collaboration create a mirage of progress, without necessarily furthering 
the resolution of underlying issues. This echoes “greenwashing” in the 
environmental space or “bluewashing” charges leveled at some United 
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Nations partnerships; these terms reference the idea that companies 
can be seen as more eco-friendly or human-rights-observant merely by 
participating in certain performative arrangements. Similarly, simply 
by announcing that they are working together or creating institutional 
auspices for their actions, platforms can look responsive to demands 
that they do something. Often this process of legitimation occurs while 
sidelining the civil society oversight that was initially envisaged as part of 
the plan.100 
The history of the Global Network Initiative (GNI) is illustrative. The 
GNI focuses on promoting freedom of expression and privacy in the infor-
mation and communications technology sector; it was formed in 2008 
in the wake of scandals in which both Yahoo! and Google were found to 
be involved in human rights violations in China. In response to public 
outcry, the two companies participated in the establishment of the GNI, 
which facilitates various industry consultations and human rights audits 
in order to establish companies’ compliance with human rights commit-
ments. Nevertheless, years later the Edward Snowden revelations showed 
that the GNI verification mechanisms had failed to reveal the extent of 
data collection and sharing by many GNI members with the U.S. govern-
ment.101 The EFF, a founding member of the GNI, resigned as a result.102 
Companies similarly appealed to the legitimacy of the GIFCT in the 
wake of the Christchurch massacre as evidence of their commitment 
to fighting the spread of violent footage.103 But when GIFCT members 
boasted that they had added over 800 new hashes to the database, there 
was no way to verify what this meant or whether it was a good marker 
of success.104 There was, for example, no way to know if these included 
legitimate media reports that used snippets of the footage, or com-
pletely erroneous content, or what proportion of the variants of footage 
uploaded the figure represented. These deficiencies repeated themselves 
in the wake of the Halle livestream, even as the platforms were congratu-
lated for their effective response.105
Content cartels also further embed and legitimize standards without 
proper public contestation. Companies and governments can use techni-
cal-sounding terms like “hashing” to describe coordinated censorship of 
material falling under the ill-defined standard of “terrorist propaganda.” 
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This suggests a quasi-scientific neutrality and verifiability to what is ulti-
mately a human and value-laden choice about what should be included. 
Similarly, choreographed cross-platform takedowns of “networks” 
deemed to be engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” suggest a 
certainty and objectivity to what companies have deemed problematic, 
but external verification is limited. 
Company takedowns of networks originating in China aimed at dele-
gitimizing protests in Hong Kong bear this out. Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google announced takedowns relatively contemporaneously and said 
they were relying on information sharing between them. But this united 
front obscured a number of questions. It soon became clear that a num-
ber of innocent accounts had been swept up in Twitter’s takedown.106 As 
one researcher put it, “There’s a lot of chaff in this wheat.”107 The sweep 
was also under-inclusive, with other researchers finding batches of coor-
dinated accounts promoting disinformation narratives that survived the 
takedowns.108 When Facebook said that it conducted an internal inves-
tigation into suspect behavior in the region “based on a tip shared by 
Twitter,”109 it was avoiding the question of why it wasn’t investigating the 
region already or why it located comparatively fewer accounts. Google 
simply announced that the accounts it took down were “consistent with 
recent observations and actions related to China announced by Facebook 
and Twitter” without releasing any examples or data of what it took 
down.110 Somewhat ironically, these statements invoke their own coordi-
nated action as a source of legitimacy for the takedowns of coordinated 
influence operations.
Transparency about standards can be difficult in these cases, 
because it could allow bad actors to game the system. But complete opac-
ity or a lack of external validation is also problematic, especially when it 
facilitates subjective censorship of political speech. As Ben Nimmo put 
it, “It’s almost like wherever you look, you’re finding this stuff.”111 Which 
means that takedowns depend on where you look. And when companies 
look where they are told by industry partners, this can create uneven 
enforcement. 
The upshot is this: Categories such as synthetic media, influence 
operations, hate speech, and harassment are far removed from the 
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well-defined category of CSAM. This speech will often be political, and 
there are contexts in which it has legitimate purposes, such as reporting 
or research. Because of this ambiguity and contentiousness, in especially 
difficult or high-profile cases this may increase companies’ inclination 
to act uniformly to avoid bearing public backlash. That is, it is precisely 
those areas in which lines are blurry and public contestation is important 
that cartelization becomes most attractive. And, as noted above, it is also 
in those cases where technical tools are hardest to develop because the 
category is harder to define. In such cases, an institutional or other col-
laborative framework can give companies an aura of legitimacy that indi-
vidual company decisions would lack. For smaller companies especially, 
it can provide a shield from scrutiny as they deal with the unexpected yet 
inevitable consequences of starting an online platform. Through these 
moves, calls for platforms to work together redirect attention away from 
resolution of the difficult anterior questions of what they should work 
together toward.
Augmenting the Power of the Powerful
Third, content cartels augment the power of already powerful actors by 
allowing them to decide standards for smaller players. This traces the 
historical experience with public international organizations where the 
faith that international efforts to combat international problems were 
inherently good gave way to the realization that “powerful states and spe-
cial interests were, in fact, steering them in favour of their own ends.”112 
As Julie Cohen writes, “[I]f a particular hub within a dominant network 
exercises disproportionate control ... then networked organization will 
amplify that hub’s authority to set policy.”113
Again, take the GIFCT. When major platforms decide that something 
constitutes “glorification of terrorist acts,” a notoriously vague category, 
they make this decision not only for themselves but for all other smaller 
GIFCT members. As we have seen, this can also be held up as a virtue. 
Developing detection technology is difficult and costly and beyond the 
capacity of many small startups. Expanding the GIFCT’s accessibility for 
smaller platforms is a key part of the Christchurch Call114 for this reason. 
Furthermore, as more and more jurisdictions impose onerous regulatory 
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obligations (many with short deadlines and high liability), operating in 
these markets could become impossible without help removing illegal 
material. 
But where lines are blurrier, the underlying premise of the market-
place of ideas suggests that there should be room for contestation and 
debate. Cartels do not allow for this. For many smaller companies, it will 
be a take-it-or-leave-it situation. While participation in the GIFCT does 
not require automatic removal of any content that matches with the 
hashing database, the time and resources needed to check individual 
content will be beyond the capacity of most smaller players. A case study 
of JustPaste.it’s experience joining the GIFCT showed how time-consum-
ing the process was, even with support and reliance on the classifications 
already in the database.115 As Brian Fishman, Facebook’s counterterror-
ism lead, put it, when it comes to whether or how to use the GIFCT data-
base, “smaller companies have to make difficult decisions about where to 
apply limited engineering resources.”116
This take-it-or-leave-it proposition will hold true for smaller gov-
ernments too. Larger or more powerful states are imposing obligations 
that tech platforms often, for ease (or, increasingly, due to legal man-
dates), apply worldwide. These powerful governments can in some 
sense become part of the cartels—defining what is permissible material 
for other countries who did not have a seat at the table. Facebook, for 
example, accedes to U.S. government “terrorist” designations and 
removes them from their platforms, even when the U.S. designates other 
state actors.117 This also creates enforcement gaps, where platforms 
enforce against those organizations that governments keep track of but 
not others. For example, Facebook and Twitter de-platform Islamic State 
extremists more often than white supremacists in the U.S. because the 
government does not keep equivalent lists. In this way, these content car-
tels augment the power of major platforms and governments by facilitat-
ing the application of their decisions globally and across the industry.118
Furthermore, within multi-stakeholder governance institutions, pow-
erful players can exploit ambiguity and bend the rules to their advantage. 
As Cohen shrewdly observes, within networked governance arrangements, 
“power interprets regulatory resistance as damage and routes around 
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it.”119 Absent the typical limits that are imposed on institutions within 
a domestic setting, these typically international efforts allow powerful 
actors to engage in regulatory arbitrage without any institutional check.120 
For example, while Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on human rights and counterterrorism, has expressed concerns about 
Facebook’s definition of terrorism,121 there is no mechanism to enforce 
the international human rights issues she raises against Facebook and 
so Facebook can accede to the demands of governments who possess the 
greatest leverage over it. 
Suggesting a False Equilibrium in the Marketplace 
of Ideas
Fourth, homogenization across different platforms, if not made recogniz-
able and overt, can be especially problematic when it comes to speech 
because it suggests a false consensus about where lines should be drawn. 
Cartels can create the misleading impression that the end result, i.e., a 
lack of diversity across platforms, was independently arrived at in multi-
ple environments instead of as a result of a single decision being applied 
across all of the platforms. Particularly in difficult or controversial areas, 
it could become increasingly attractive for platforms to adopt a kind of 
default position instead of facilitating the kind of diversity that could 
help continually reevaluate the bounds of accepted expression. In some 
areas such continual reevaluation is not necessary: For example, the 
desirability and definition of CSAM is quite properly well settled. But, as 
has been a continual theme of this paper, as pressure grows to expand 
this model to other areas, the risks are greater because few categories are 
so determinate. 
***
A complaint about monopoly power over public discourse is, at heart, a 
complaint about the use of unaccountable power to demarcate the public 
sphere in ways that do not adequately serve public ends. This can happen 
in more ways than one, and content cartels recreate this risk in another 
form. Mary Anne Franks has powerfully written that to “truly believe 
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in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ means to reject speech monopolies and 
speech cartels, to challenge the hoarding of expressive rights by the most 
privileged members of society.”122 Current content cartels, as well as the 
future ones we are likely hurtling toward, allow participants to launder 
difficult decisions through opaque processes to make them appear more 
legitimate than they really are and do not mitigate the threat of a handful 
of actors holding too much power over the public sphere. 
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GUARDRAILS AND GOVERNANCE
Those concerned with monopoly power over public discourse should similarly be concerned about the rise of content cartels. But is it possible to keep the baby of helpful collabora-
tion and throw out the bathwater of harmful cartels? In some areas and 
for some problems, platforms working together can be beneficial. But in 
which areas and how platforms collaborate is as important as that they do. 
When Should Platforms Cooperate?
The scoping question of when to collaborate is fundamental and is 
currently being answered by the interests of the powerful, in reaction to 
particular crises. Platforms themselves decide (determined of course in 
large part by public and regulatory pressure) when, how, and with whom 
collaboration will occur. An observation from another context is apt: 
“Reasonable minds may differ as to what the ideal balance between coop-
eration and resistance might be, but it seems unlikely that this balance 
should be left to the judgment of a private corporation.”123
The appropriate level of cooperation is not an easy question. It might 
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be tempting to say that cartels are always too great a threat to diversity in 
the marketplace of ideas, but such a response exacts a large cost. If you 
accept that there need to be standards for speech online,124 it is difficult 
to defend the proposition that these standards should not be enforced 
effectively. In cases where a lack of coordination means simply moving 
the problem around or, worse, smaller platforms either using blunter 
tools or not moderating at all, collaboration could be a boon. Should 
smaller platforms be denied the technology to remove violent propa-
ganda on their platforms (which in many cases ends up there only after 
being banned by major platforms) in the name of marketplace diversity? 
Should these platforms be forced to choose between less nuanced hate 
speech detection tools or a species of free speech absolutism to avoid 
cartelization? What if this leads to exactly the kind of echo chambers that 
are most concerning? Homogenization of the public sphere cannot be our 
only concern.
Another response might be to say that cartels should only exist for 
categories of content that are well defined and do not implicate value 
judgments, but this distinction quickly collapses. None of these lines 
avoid value judgments. Even the most neutral-sounding, such as “coor-
dinated inauthentic behavior,” rely on fundamental judgments about 
required levels of “authenticity”125 and permissible forms of freedom of 
association.126 
Ultimately, the answer will differ in each context. There are some 
easy cases: When a category of content is illegal and comparatively 
definable and the effective detection and removal of its presence online 
depends on technological tools that it is impossible or impractical for all 
platforms to develop individually, collaboration can be useful—provided 
there is appropriate oversight. CSAM is the obvious case. Another context 
might be footage of extreme violence like the Christchurch massacre 
(provided that collaboration is done in a way that prevents creep into 
less extreme but still controversial content). Facebook has, for example, 
announced a partnership with law enforcement to use bodycam footage 
from training exercises to train an AI tool to identify and remove violent 
first-person footage.127 Smaller platforms could benefit from the use of 
such technology but cannot develop it themselves. 
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At the other end of the spectrum are easy cases too: In matters of 
platform policy only—where the question is not one of sharing techni-
cal tools—and where the category of content is legal and contestable, 
platforms should have to make and justify their rules openly and on their 
own. What to do with Alex Jones types, or “glorification of terrorism,” or 
dispiriting but legal posts by public figures should not be decided behind 
an unaccountable “consensus.” Platforms should be forced to transpar-
ently justify their individual decisions in accordance with their public 
rules.
Between these two ends of the spectrum are the hard cases. Ulti-
mately, the answer should depend on an empirical inquiry into factors 
such as the prevalence of that category of content; the accuracy of the 
relevant technology; the cost and practicality of small platforms develop-
ing similar tools; the relevant risk of harm; and, especially, the contest-
ability of the category definition and whether it implicates speech, such 
as political speech, that is ordinarily highly protected. More research is 
needed for a true assessment of social welfare costs and benefits. This 
requires greater openness from companies (with a nudge from regulators, 
if necessary). In the meantime, in these cases, ad hoc, opaque carteliza-
tion should not be encouraged.
In any collaboration, adopted tools and standards need to be legiti-
mized through adequate due process, consultation, and reliance on more 
universally legitimate norms than individual private company judgment. 
Basing moderation policies on international human rights norms, for 
example, gives companies a framework for making rights-compliant deci-
sions, along with a globally understood vocabulary for articulating their 
enforcement decisions to governments and individuals.128 Homogeniza-
tion may be less concerning when it is based on independent norms that 
can be contested and adjudicated outside the four walls of any particular 
company. This requires adequate oversight.
Legitimizing Cooperation and Avoiding Content 
Cartels
In a big way, addressing the accountability deficits of cartels requires 
addressing the accountability deficits of the platforms themselves. This 
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is an ongoing project beyond my focus here. This section looks at the 
additional measures that can and should be taken to prevent cartels 
compounding underlying platform problems. The prescriptions are nec-
essarily general and will need to be adapted to context, but they provide 
a starting point.
Crucially, the independent oversight that is often part of early plans 
needs to be meaningfully implemented in the final institutional design. 
Independent experts and civil society must have access to the informa-
tion needed to check the processes and outcomes of collaboration. As the 
GNI example shows, these oversight mechanisms need to be adequately 
empowered, with the capacity to demand information and raise flags. 
Acknowledging this necessity, Facebook has recently announced plans 
to make the GIFCT an independent body129—however, without details or 
a timeline, it is impossible to assess whether this will involve substantive 
and meaningful oversight. As governments push for cartelization in cer-
tain areas, they should build in mandates for independent human rights 
audits.
Because speech decisions are of such public importance and impli-
cate fundamental rights, legitimation will necessarily include the trite but 
true call for more transparency. Effective collaboration not only needs to 
be done but needs to be seen to be done. As Sabino Cassese notes about 
global administrative law, “A fair procedure plays an important role in 
building social consensus. Process control or voice encourage people’s 
cooperation with authorities and lead to legitimacy.”130 The current pro-
cedural and accountability deficits of these arrangements mean that they 
suffer from legitimacy deficits regardless of whether they are substan-
tively beneficial, because their advantages cannot be verified.
Currently, there is little incentive for companies to be more transpar-
ent. Twitter was the only company that released its data on takedowns 
of Chinese information operations against Hong Kong protestors—as a 
result, it faced the brunt of scrutiny and criticism about mistakenly iden-
tified accounts which other, less open, platforms evaded. But without 
greater transparency, there can be no accountability. While there are 
tradeoffs involved in the level of transparency platforms should provide 
(such as privacy risks or enabling bad actors to game the system), the 
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status quo is very far from the optimal balance, and the interest that 
determines what is disclosed is not that of the public interest but that of 
the companies. What transparency there is often amounts to transpar-
ency theater. The GIFCT released its first “transparency report”131 in the 
second half of 2019, and at a mere 1,500 words, revealed very little new 
information. 
Transparency mandates should demand metrics that are auditable 
and also incentivize desirable behavior. For example, when the primary 
metric reported in the GIFCT report is the number of hashes added to the 
database, this incentivizes adding hashes but not increasing the accuracy 
of the hashes added. And because we do not know which platforms are 
responsible for adding the content or how they use the database to police 
their individual services, we do not know the power or effectiveness of 
the individual platforms’ participation in the project. Similarly, reports 
on influence campaign takedowns rarely provide tools to independently 
evaluate company actions, beyond the salutary news that companies are 
indeed working together in some capacity and taking some sort of action. 
But the underlying systems that lead to this collaboration and action, 
including the level of government participation, remain almost entirely 
opaque. So too are the biases or blind spots of the technological tools 
used by cartels—any such technology needs to be subject to independent 
algorithmic auditing in order to identify and correct any disparate impact.
Accountability also requires access to remediation. If there is cen-
tralized censorship, there should be centralized remediation. If a piece of 
content is taken down because it was in the GIFCT database, for example, 
then a challenge to this takedown on any individual platform needs to 
feed back into the GIFCT network so that decisions made collectively do 
not need to be challenged individually. Similarly, if platforms rely on 
each other’s signals to takedown influence campaigns, there needs to be 
more information about the extent of this reliance and a process for those 
who are mistakenly affected to challenge actions taken against them. If 
done effectively, this could turn an accountability deficit into an advan-
tage, by providing access to remediation for people affected by decisions 
made on platforms that do not otherwise have the resources or the will to 
build out an entire appeals process of their own.
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Power imbalances in the decision-making structures of these insti-
tutions also need to be addressed. Larger platforms may be the source of 
the technology, but they should not be the source of all decisions. The 
technical tools still need humans to tell them what to look for, and these 
decisions should be made through representative and collaborative 
processes. This will be further facilitated by greater transparency into 
negotiation processes to ensure that all stakeholders’ interests are ade-
quately represented and accounted for. A promising model is that piloted 
by Cloudflare, which has built in capacity for its clients to calibrate CSAM 
technology provided by Cloudflare to suit the different needs of different 
platforms.132 While such negotiations or adjustments may slow initiatives 
in the short term or make agreements more difficult or costly to achieve, 
in the long term they also serve the interests of those companies and 
governments that hope to relieve public pressure by legitimating these 
initiatives. For speech decisions, perhaps more than in any other case, 
openness and accountability are the only way to ensure that decisions 
made in the name of improving public discourse actually do so.
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CONCLUSION
The management of online public discourse is at a turning point. Platforms are being called on to do more, to do better, and to work together. The choice between ruthless com-
petition and monopoly power is a false one—each poses its own risks 
to public discourse. Collaboration presents another option, but the task 
now is to develop institutional designs that legitimize this cooperation 
and halt the rise of unaccountable content cartels.
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